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Abstract.
Many quantum key distribution (QKD) implementations using a free space
transmission path are restricted to operation at night time in order to distinguish
the signal photons used for a secure key establishment from background light. Here,
we present a lean entanglement-based QKD system overcoming that limitation. By
implementing spectral, spatial and temporal filtering techniques, we were able to
establish a secure key continuously over several days under varying light and weather
conditions.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 42.79.Sz, 42.50.Ex
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1. Introduction
Since its inception by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [1], quantum cryptography has
made the transition from a concept to a technology mature enough for commercial
development [2, 3]. There are several flavors of quantum cryptography or quantum key
distribution. The initial formulation, and all current commercial systems implement
so-called prepare and send (PaS) protocols [4], where some degree of freedom of light is
prepared by one party, Alice, and sent to the other party, Bob, who then measures it in
one out of several complementary bases. Estimation of the errors in the measurement
results of the receiver allows both parties to place an upper bound on the knowledge of
an eavesdropper, and is used for a subsequent removal of this knowledge in a privacy
amplification step.
Another family of protocols evolved out of a proposal by Ekert in 1991 (E91,
[5]). These protocols use entanglement as the main resource, and combine some of
the measurements on the biphotons such that a Bell inequality can be tested, or the
state is tomographically estimated [6] to evaluate the knowledge of an eavesdropper.
An important development was an explicit way to calculate the amount of information
leaked to an eavesdropper out of a less than perfect violation of a Bell inequality [7],
which makes it possible to implement this idea in a practical system with imperfect
sources and measurement devices [8]. These protocols reduce the assumptions about
the physical implementation (like e.g. the size of the Hilbert space used to encode
information) in comparison with most PaS QKD schemes.
An entanglement-based BB84-type QKD scheme was described by Bennett,
Brassard and Mermin in 1992 (BBM92, [9]). There, the prepare part of BB84 is
replaced by a measurement scheme similar to the receiver side, but the knowledge of
an eavesdropper is still evaluated from the observed errors. This results in a larger
fraction of final key bits than under a full E91 protocol in its quantitative version [7],
and probably maintains the insensitivity against an unknown size of the Hilbert space,
as long as the measurement devices can be trusted. Furthermore, this scheme retrieves
the randomness for the key used for encryption directly out of the measurement process
on a quantum system, and does not need to provide for an active choice of a key bit.
This QKD scheme has been demonstrated in the field [10, 11] using optical fiber links
without amplifiers or signal regeneration stages. If the link is to be established ad hoc,
e.g. in a mobile environment, or it is not feasible to have a fiber deployed (e.g. in
the satellite QKD proposals [12, 13]), propagation of the photons through free space is
necessary. A free space transmission channel using polarization encoding of the qubits
has the advantage of not inducing decoherence (negligible birefringence of air), and has
low absorption under clear weather conditions.
So far, such entanglement based QKD systems over free space have been
demonstrated at night, taking advantage of low background light levels [8, 14, 15, 16, 17].
In this paper we demonstrate daylight operation of a QKD system implementing a
BBM92 protocol. Continuous operation over a full day/night cycle brings free space
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entanglement based QKD one step closer to the stage of development of free space PaS
protocols, where such daylight operation has been shown [18, 19].
2. Background rate estimations
The main challenge for operating over a free space channel in daylight is to handle
the high background from the sun. First, actively quenched avalanche photodiode
(APD) detectors may be subject to irreversible destruction when exposed to an excessive
amount of light; such a situation may occur if there is excessive scattering in the optical
communication link. For passively quenched APDs this is not a problem, since the
electrical power deposited into the device can be limited to a safe operation regime at
all times.
Second, saturation of detectors leads to a reduced probability of detecting photons
at high light levels. This effect can usually be modeled by a dead time τd or recovery
time for the device. For passively quenched APDs, this time is about 1µs, but may
be over an order of magnitude smaller for actively quenched devices. While modeling
the saturation with a single dead time τd may not completely reflect the details of the
re-arming of a detector, it gives a useful estimation of the fraction of time a detector
can register photoevents. Given an initial photoevent rate r (i.e., the rate a detector
with no recovery time would report), a detector with dead time τd will register a rate of
r′ = r(1− r′τd) or r
′ = r
1
1 + rτd
. (1)
Third, a high background level will lead to detection events which are mistaken with
the detection of a photon pair. These are uncorrelated in their polarization and lead to
an increase in the quantum bit error ratio (QBER), which is used to establish a bound
for the knowledge of an eavesdropper. In the following, we estimate the operational
limit for generating a useful key under such conditions, assuming an implementation
of a symmetrical BBM92 protocol, i.e., both complementary measurement bases are
chosen with an equal probability of 50% on both measurement units.
Assuming that all quoted rates already include detector efficiencies, we can
characterize a pair source by its single event rates, r1, r2, and its coincidence rate rc.
We denote the transmission of the entire optical channel as T , in which we include
absorptive losses in optical components, the air, geometrical losses due to imperfect
mode transfer from an optical fiber, and losses in spatial filters.
The signal or raw key rate for a symmetric BBM92 protocol is given by half of the
detected coincidence rate,
rsig =
1
2
rcT . (2)
For an external background event rate rbg, a coincidence time interval of τc, and
assuming no correlations between source and background events, the accidental
coincidence rate with matching bases is given by
ra =
1
2
(r1 − Trc) (rbg + T (r2 − rc)) τc , (3)
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assuming that only one of the detectors, here with index 2, is exposed to the background
events.
Imperfections in practical entangled photon pair source and the detector projection
errors are often characterized by visibilities of polarization correlations VHV and V±45◦ .
The intrinsic QBER qi of the QKD system with a symmetric usage of both bases is
given by
qi =
1
2
(
1−
VHV + V±45◦
2
)
. (4)
The polarization of background events on one side can be assumed to be uncorrelated
the photons detected in the other arm, thus the QBER due to accidentally identified
coincidences is 1/2. The total QBER qt of the complete ensemble is given by the
weighted average over both components,
qt =
1
rsig + ra
(
qirsig +
1
2
ra
)
=
qircT + (r1 − Trc) (rbg + T (r2 − rc)) τc/2
rcT + (r1 − Trc) (rbg + T (r2 − rc)) τc
. (5)
The detector saturation modifies both signal and accidental rates similarly to equation
(1) by the same dead time correction factor α, where we assume an equal distribution
of photoevents over all four detectors, resulting in a dead time constant of τd/4:
α =
1
1 + (rbg + r2T )τd/4
. (6)
Therefore, the resulting QBER qt in equation (5) does not get affected. However, the
signal rate does, leading to the modified expression
r′sig = αrsig =
rcT/2
1 + (rbg + r2T )τd/4
. (7)
For typical parameters in our experiment (r′1=78 kcps, r
′
2=71 kcps, r
′
c=11 kcps, τd = 1µs,
T=15%, qi=4.3%, τc=2ns), the total detector rate rt = α(rbg+r2T ) on the receiver side,
the available raw key bit rate r′sig and the resulting QBER qt are plotted as a function of
an external background rate rbg in figure 6. Above a certain background rate, qt would
exceed the limit of 11% for which a secret key can be established for individual attack
schemes [4].
It is instructive to consider the excess QBER due to background events:
∆q = qt − qi = (r1 − Trc) rbgτc
1/2− qi
rcT + r1rbgτc
. (8)
In a parameter regime useful for key generation, qi ≪ 1/2, rsig ≫ ra, and for simplicity
assuming r1 ≫ Trc, this quantity can be approximated by
∆q ≈
rbgτc
2T (rc/r1)
. (9)
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Figure 1. Schematic diagram of the QKD setup. Components are a sending telescope
(ST), single mode fibers (SMF), a waveplate (WP), compensating crystals (CC) to
address birefringent walk-off; polarization analyzer units (PA) comprising a 50:50 Beam
splitter (BS), polarizing beam splitters (PBS) and a half wave plate (HW); a timestamp
unit (TU) referenced to a Rb oscillator (Rb), a receiving telescope (RT) with a pinhole
(PH) for spatial filtering and an interference filter (IF) for spectral filtering.
While the source property rc/r1 and the channel transmission T are typically optimized
already, the only way to reduce the excess error ∆q is to reduce the background rate rbg
and the coincidence time window τc. The limitation on reducing τc is the timing jitter
of all detectors, which in our case is on the order of a nanosecond. Emphasis thus has
to be drawn to reduce the background rate rbg.
3. Experimental setup
We prepare the polarization-entangled photon pairs in a source based on type-II
parametric down conversion (PDC) in a non-collinear configuration [20]. It is pumped
with a CW free-running diode laser with power of 30mW and a center wavelength of
407 nm, producing pairs at a degenerate wavelength around 814 nm (similar to [21]) in
single mode fibers. When directly connected to single photon detectors, we typically
observe single rate per arm of 78 kcps and 71 kcps, with a coincidence rate of 12 kcps.
The visibility of polarization correlations in the HV and ±45◦ basis are 97.5 ± 0.5%
and 92.1± 0.8%, respectively. While these sources have been substantially surpassed in
quality and brightness [22, 23], this particular device is both simple and robust.
The minimal incident angle γ of the sun and the line of sight was about 16◦. As
endpoints in our transmission channel, we use a pair of custom telescopes to transmit
one member of the entangled photon pair across a distance of 350m for convenient
logistics. The relative orientation of both telescopes is adjusted using manual tip/tilt
stages with an angular resolution of ≈10µrad, mounted on tripods intended for mobile
satellite links. The telescopes are not actively stabilized, but this could be added for
Daylight operation of a free space, entanglement-based quantum key distribution system6
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
 795  800  805  810  815  820  825  830
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
filt
er
 tr
an
sm
iss
io
n 
(%
)
so
u
rc
e
 s
pe
ct
ru
m
 (a
.u.
)
λ (nm)
λ0 = 813.1 nm
∆λFWHM = 8.7 nm
λ0 = 811.4 nm
∆λFWHM = 6.7 nm
Figure 2. Spectral distribution of photons from the SPDC source, and transmission
profile of the interference filter used to suppress background light outside that range.
With this filter/source combination, a signal loss of 57% is introduced.
spanning larger distances, or to compensate for thermal drifts in the mounting stages
[24, 25, 16].
Similarly to [15], the sending telescope consists of fiber port, a small achromat with
f = 100mm to reduce the effective numerical-aperture of the single mode fiber, and a
main achromat with f = 310mm and 75mm diameter, transforming the optical mode
of the fiber to a collimated Gaussian beam with a waist parameter of 20mm. Nominally
this results in a Rayleigh length of 1.6 km at our operation wavelength, well above our
target distance.
A combination of spectral, spatial and temporal filtering is used to reduce the
background to tolerable levels. At the receiving end, an identical f = 310mm achromat
as the front lens focuses the incoming light onto a pinhole of 30µm diameter at its
focal position for spatial filtering. Assuming diffraction-limited performance of that
lens, this corresponds to a solid angle of 2.3 × 10−9 sr. The pinhole is then imaged
with a magnification of 6.8 through an interference filter onto the passively quenched
silicon avalanche detectors with an active diameter of 500µm in a compact module that
performs passively the random basis selection for the measurement [26] (see figure 1).
Our pair source has a measured spectral width of 8.7 nm, given by the phase
matching conditions, and the geometry of the collection [27]. An interference filter with
a peak transmission of 72% and a full width at half-maximum of 6.7 nm was chosen to
maximize the amount of signal transmitted and eliminate the background outside of the
spectral region of the source (see figure 2). This filter reduces the ambient background
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Figure 3. Schematic of the optical ports. To reduce the scattering from ambient
radiation into the optical path, the transmitter telescope areas are shielded and coated
inside with diffuse blackout material. On the receiver side, several baffles reduce the
impact of strong ambient light entering the telescope under small angles.
level by about two orders of magnitude, much less than what can be achieved in PaS
experiments based on extremely narrow band lasers and matching spectral filters.
A significant reduction of background events was also achieved addressing scattering
from various elements in the field-of-view (FOV) of the detector, and from scatterers
close to the optical channel (see figure 3). Reduction of the FOV with a smaller
pinhole is finally limited by diffraction; we found a 30µm pinhole to be the optimal
choice when considering pointing accuracy and signal transmission. This corresponds
to a FOV of ≈ 73mm diameter for our test range which will strongly contribute to
daylight background counts. A circular area with a diameter of about 3 FOV as well as
the inside of the sending telescope is covered with low scattering blackout material.
The blackout area was also shielded against direct sunlight. Together, these steps
reduce the background by about 12 dB. A set of apertures at the receiver telescope
removes light coupled to the detector by multiple reflections from outside the line-of-
sight. Five concentric apertures extending 30 cm upstream, and seven apertures with
tapered diameters downstream of the main receiver lens matched the receiving mode
and reduced the background by about 3-4 dB.
The processing of detection events into a final key has been described in [15] and
the software is available as open source [28]. Each detector event results in a NIM pulse
which is sent to a custom timestamp unit with a nominal resolution of 125 ps, referenced
to a local Rb oscillator. Our time stamp units exhibit a dead time of 128 ns, and are
able to transfer up to 6 · 106 events per second to a commodity host PC via a USB
connection. The timing information on one of the sides is then losslessly encoded as
differences between consecutive events with an adaptive resolution, and together with
the basis information sent to the other side on a classical channel, in our case over a
standard wireless TCP/IP connection. The encoding, together with a small overhead,
consumes about 13% more bandwidth than necessary due to the Shannon limit. To
minimize the bandwidth for this communication, the timing information was sent from
the source side with lower overall detection rate during daylight conditions.
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To identify corresponding photon pair events, the temporal correlation of the two
photons generated in the PDC process is used [29], with a coincidence time window
determined by the combined timing jitter from both photodetector sets, the timestamp
electronics, and the time difference servoing.
For that process to work, an initial time difference between the two receiver units
due to different timing origins and light propagation is determined to a resolution of 2 ns
using a tiered cross correlation technique on a set of detector events acquired over ≈ 5
seconds. Once that time difference is established, coincidences are identified within
a time window of τc = 2ns. Its center drift due to residual frequency differences
between the two reference clocks is tracked with a servo loop with an integration time
constant of 2 s for events falling in a time window ±3.75 ns around the expected center for
coincidence events. We were able to resynchronize the system during daylight conditions
at a coincidence rate of 1 500 cps up to an ambient light level of 250 kcps, well below
saturation of the detectors.
To maintain a common time frame when no useful signal is available for servoing,
one of the clock frequencies was manually adjusted such that the relative frequency
difference was ≈ 10−12. This would allow a loss of signal over a period of two hours
without loss of timing lock. Again, the tight time correlation of the photon pairs
emerging in PDC acts as a natural way of comparing differences and synchronizing
clocks at a distance easily. The ability to resynchronize during daytime and the use
of the PDC signal for mutual calibration of the clocks makes this system very robust
against signal interruptions or temporal unavailability of the channel.
In the discussion of temporal filtering we have assumed that all detectors on one side
have the same relative lag, or more generally, that their temporal response is identical.
This detector equivalence is not guaranteed, and is necessary for an efficient time filtering
and, more importantly, to prevent information leakage to an eavesdropper [30]. Figure 4
shows the measured time differences between those pairs of detector combinations which
contribute to the key generation. The figure shows that detectors from the same basis
are well matched, but there is significant difference between the two bases. Given our
detector assignment, the information leakage is 0.52% and 0.44% in the HV and ±45◦
basis, respectively. For continuously pumped sources, extraction of timing information
by an eavesdropper would need a measurement of the presence of a photon in the
communication channel without disturbing the polarization state; with pulsed sources,
however, the problem becomes more acute, as the pulse train provides a clock with
which to compare the publicly exchanged timing information.
4. Experimental results
The experiment was run continuously over a period from 9.11.2008, 18:00 SGT to
14.11.2008, 2:00 SGT over four consecutive days. In this period we saw extremely bright
sunlight, tropical thunderstorms and partly cloudy weather; over the whole period the
rate of detected pairs and background events varied by about 2 orders of magnitude.
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Figure 4. Histograms of time delays between the four main coincidence combinations
contributing to the raw key. The overlap between detector pairs operating in the
same basis is excellent, but there is approximately 0.5 ns difference between the two
detector groupings. The coincidence window of 2 ns is indicated in the graph, showing
that we are loosing some key generating counts. If the detector groups were mutually
compensated, the coincidence window could have be tightened with no loss of signal,
but reducing the background proportionally.
In figure 5 we show the results collected over two consecutive days. On the second day
we identified 14.72 · 107 raw coincidences. After sifting, this resulted in 7.18 · 107 of raw
uncorrected bits, with a total of 3.5 · 106 errors corrected using a modified CASCADE
protocol [31], which was carried out over blocks of at least 5 000 bits to a target bit error
ratio of 10−9.
For the privacy amplification step, we arrive at a knowledge of an eavesdropper
on the error-corrected raw key determined by (a) the actual information revealed in
the error correction process, and (b) the asymptotic (i.e. assuming infinite key length)
expression for the eavesdropping knowledge inferred from the actually observed QBER
qT , IE = −qt log2 qt − (1 − qt) log2(1 − qt) of an equivalent true single photon BB84
protocol. Privacy amplification itself is carried out by binary multiplication/addition
of blocks of raw key vectors with a length of at least 5 000 bits with a rectangular
matrix filled with a pseudorandom balanced bit stream from a 32 bit linear-feedback
shift register, seeded with a number from a high-entropy source for each block. We are
left with 3.33 · 107 of secure bits for this 24 hour period, corresponding to an average
key generation rate of 385 bits per second (bps). In these conditions, the key generation
rates are far from uniform during the acquisition period; we see a maximum secure key
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Figure 5. (color online) Experimental results for 10th and 11th November 2008. The
top panel records the firing rate of the single photon detectors. The stable trace (a)
corresponds to a detector connected directly to one arm of the source and isolated from
changes in ambient light. The other trace (b) is the detector coupled to the free space
channel. The middle panel traces show (c) the number of raw pair events, (d) sifted
events, and (e) error corrected and privacy amplified key. The lower panel shows the
number of “accidental” pair events detected (g), and the QBER level as a percentage
(f). All experimental points are sampled down, and the solid lines represent a moving
average as a guide to the eye.
generation rate of 533 bps in darkness and a minimum of 29 bps around noon in rainy
conditions.
The raw key compression ratio in the privacy amplification step should actually also
take care of a limited entropy in the raw key due to part-to-part variation in detector
efficiencies. This information was obtained before the main key generation process by
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Events H +45◦ V −45◦
H 599 22 791 34 032 18 409
+45◦ 18 647 2 894 17 512 44 841
V 29 062 16 422 2 125 25 246
−45◦ 14 635 40 558 22 280 1 498
Table 1. Correlation events between each of the four detectors on both sides
establishing the complete correlation matrix (see table 1) out of an ensemble of 148 493
coincidence events with matching bases. The asymmetry between 0 and 1 results in
the HV basis is 53.9 : 46.1 ± 0.2%, and in the ±45◦ basis 52.5 : 47.5 ± 0.2%. Using
again entropy as a simple measure of information leakage, this detector asymmetry
would allow an eavesdropper to obtain 0.45% of the raw key for events in the HV
basis, and 0.18% in the ±45◦ basis. At the moment, however, it is not obvious that a
simple reduction of the final key size in the privacy amplification step due to various
information leakage channels would be sufficient to ensure that the eavesdropper has no
access to any elements of the final key. We also note that the choice between the two
measurement bases is not completely balanced; the ratio of HV vs. ±45◦ coincidences
is 42.5 : 57.5± 0.1%. Furthermore, this asymmetry varies over time. For the combined
asymmetry between logical 0 and 1 bits in the raw key we find around 51.5% during night
time, and 54.0% during daytime. A system which captures this variability in detection
efficiencies (and also would allow to discover selective detector blinding attacks) would
have to monitor this asymmetry continuously.
As introduced in section 2 we can estimate how well the experiment performs for a
given number of background events. Figure 6 shows theoretical values for background-
and signal rates according to equations (5) and (7), and experimental data for the 25 000
recorded outputs of the error correction module during the two days of the experiment.
The dead-time affected detector response is also shown assuming τd = 1µs. The night
time periods with rsig ≈ 12 kcps and a total dark count rate of 7 kcps contribute to
events on the low background regime of the experiment forming a vertical line to the
left of figure 6. We cannot differentiate between fluctuations due to changes in the
source and those in the transmission channel, but since the source itself was protected
against thermal fluctuations, we attribute them to variations in transmission T due to
changes in the coupling of the telescopes. The strongly fluctuating background during
daytime contributes to the broadly scattered data between rbg = 20 and 500 kcps. If the
source properties and channel coupling were constant, the deviation of qt and rsig from
the theoretical value would be both randomly distributed. Figure 6, however, shows
more structure in rsig than in qt which we attribute to changes in the coupling between
the telescopes due to thermal expansion. Nevertheless, the experimental values fit the
theoretical prediction well. We note that saturation of the detectors is never a problem.
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Figure 6. Detection behavior due to an external background rate rbg for parameters
representative for our experiment: The detected background rate r′bg shows saturation,
due to the intrinsic dead time of the four detectors. Less counts are detected for higher
count rates. The observed background rate increases up to ≈ 450 kcps, which leads also
to a reduction of the sifted key rate, rsig, by 20% and an increase of the resulting QBER
qt up to 6.5%. The efficient filtering of the ambient light prevents a higher background,
which would lead to an increase of the QBER above the threshold of 11% where no
private key can be established between the two parties at a count rate of 1.8·106 cps.
This threshold is not reached during the whole experiment, thus continuous operation
is possible when the coupling between the parties is maintained.
There are two contributors to the variability in key generation rate: First,
atmospheric conditions such as rainfall reduce the transmission and thus the number
of raw key events before the error correction and privacy amplification steps, but the
QBER remains unchanged. On the other hand we have extremely bright conditions
where accidental coincidences increase significantly. In this regime, as the background
rises, the signal rate is reduced due to the dead time of the detectors. Furthermore,
the QBER increases according to equation (5), occasionally preventing the generation
of a secure key [4]. But even under bright conditions, the system still keeps track of the
time drift between the two reference clocks with the time-correlated coincidences from
the source without a need for re-synchronization.
5. Conclusions
We have demonstrated the continuous running of a free space entanglement QKD system
over several full day-night cycles in variable weather conditions. A combination of
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filtering techniques is used to overcome the highly variable illumination and transmission
conditions. The software and synchronization scheme can tolerate the remaining 16 dB
variation in light levels without interruption of the key generation. We continuously
generate error corrected, privacy amplified key at an average rate of 385 bps. With the
newly available bright sources larger distances and/or a higher key generation rates are
possible.
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